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Abstract 
The goal of model-based diagnosis is to iso­
late causes of anomalous system behavior and 
recommend cost-effective repair actions. In 
general, precomputing optimal repair policies 
is intractable. To date, investigators address­
ing this problem have explored approxima­
tions that either impose restrictions on the 
system model, such as a single fault assump­
tion, or that compute an immediate best ac­
tion with limited lookahead. In this paper, 
we develop a formulation of repair in model­
based diagnosis and a repair algorithm that 
computes optimal sequences of actions. This 
optimal approach is costly but can be applied 
to precompute an optimal repair strategy for 
compact systems. We show how we can ex­
ploit a hierarchical system specification to 
make this approach tractable for larger sys­
tems. When introducing hierarchy, we also 
consider the tradeoff between simply replac­
ing a component and decomposing it to repair 
its subcomponents. The hierarchical repair 
algorithm is suitable for off-line precomputa­
tion of an optimal repair strategy. A modi­
fication of the algorithm takes advantage of 
an iterative-deepening scheme to trade off in­
ference time and the quality of the computed 
strategy. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The goal of probabilistic model-based diagnosis is com­
putation of a minimum expected cost sequence of ob­
servation and repair actions to restore a malfunction­
ing system to working order. In general, the computa­
tion of such an optimal repair strategy is intractable. 
We must consider each possible strategy in a combina­
torial space of repair strategies to compute the optimal 
strategy. 
The intractability of general diagnosis can be ad­
dressed in several ways. Several researchers have 
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explored methods that rely on the imposition of a 
greedy, myopic assumption for generation of repair 
strategies (for example, [Friedrich & Nejdl, 1992; 
Beckerman et al, 1995]). These methods compute 
a good immediate repair action or policy. A best 
next action is carried out, revealing additional in­
formation about the world which is used to com­
pute a revised policy. Investigators have also im­
posed restrictions on the system model. A com­
mon restriction is the assumption that only a sin­
gle fault is present [Kalagnanam & Benrion, 1988; 
Beckerman et al, 1995]. 
In this paper, we take a different approach. Rather 
than relaxing the goal of optimality via assumptions 
of greediness or imposition of modeling restrictions, we 
gain tractability by exploiting the hierarchical struc­
ture of complex systems. The rest of the paper is struc­
tured as follows: First, we formalize the general repair 
problem in non-hierarchical systems and develop an 
algorithm to generate optimal repair policies. The ini­
tial algorithm we develop is only suitable for systems 
with small numbers of components because the prob­
lem it solves is inherently exponential in the number of 
components. We show how we can extend the applica­
bility of the approach by adapting the optimal repair 
algorithm to handling systems cast as a hierarchy of 
components. This results in an algorithm that can 
be used off-line to tractably compute optimal repair 
policies for large hierarchical systems. We show how 
the algorithm exploits the hierarchy to gain tractabil­
ity. We then introduce flexibility into the algorithm 
so that it can be used in real time. We do so by in­
corporating an iterative-deepening scheme that trades 
off the timeliness of a response for the quality of the 
computed strategy. We conclude with a discussion ex­
amining related work. 
2 PROBLEM DEFINITION 
Consider a system with n components, any of which 
may fail. Each component C; has a set of discrete­
valued inputs Il, I[, ... , I;k and one discrete-valued 
output 0;. We refer to the vector of variables (Il, I[, 
. .. , In as I;. 
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Let us assume that the outputs and inputs of the com­
ponents are connected in accordance with the causal 
flow of a system-we assume that there are no feed­
back loops in the system. We also assume that the 
system has a single designated output variable. Hence, 
when viewed as a black box, the system has a set of 
input variables which we will call the system input vari­
ables and one output variable which we will call the 
system output variable. 
Each component C; can assume any of a set of pos­
sible operating states. One of these states ok; is a 
distinguished state which corresponds to the compo­
nent's normal mode of operation. The other states of 
C; correspond to states where the component is not 
operating normally. We will assume that components 
fail independently. The state of C; is modeled by a 
probabilistic state variable M;. The user specifies a 
prior probability distribution over the states of M;. 
This distribution quantifies the reliability of C; and is 
specified based on empirical data and expert knowl­
edge. 
The model of operation of the component specifies the 
value of the output of the component given the state 
of the component and the values of the inputs. When 
the component C; is in the state ok; we will assume 
that a deterministic model of operation is available 
- that is, given an input state, exactly one output 
state is possible. However, for the other states, we 
will leave open the possibility that the behavior is 
non-deterministic; for each of these states, the user 
can specify a probability distribution over the output 
for every possible input state. Specifying the model 
of operation of the component amounts to specifying 
the distribution P( 0; \M;, I;) (with the restriction that 
P(O; = o;\M; = ok;,l; = i;) always takes the value 
0 or 1 for any o; and i;). Finally, the user specifies a 
cost of replacement c; for C;. c; is the materials and 
labor cost of simply discarding the existing part and 
replacing it with a new one. 
Say we are observing the artifact modeled by our sys­
tem model and we observe some anomaly. That is, the 
system is given an input vector (which we can observe) 
and we observe that the system output is inconsistent 
with the correct operation of the system. 
We wish to take actions to repair the system. We will 
define repairing the system as correcting the perceived 
anomalous observation. The actions available to us 
are replacement of components. A repair strategy is a 
sequence in which the components are replaced. After 
each successive replacement we check the output of 
the system. We assume the input is fixed to the input 
vector associated with the observed anomaly. If the 
output is still anomalous, we continue to replace the 
next component recommended by the strategy. If the 
output is no longer anomalous we stop. Executing each 
possible repair strategy (i.e., each repair sequence) has 
an expected cost. The optimal repair strategy is the 
one with the least expected cost for a particular system 
input. 
If we compute the optimal strategy for each possible 
system input value, we determine the optimal repair 
plan for the system. The optimal repair plan is a set 
of situation-action rules. If a system has anomalous 
behavior, the optimal repair plan gives us a repair 
strategy to use as a function of the input. We will 
now develop an algorithm to compute optimal repair 
plans. 
2.1 COMPUTING THE OPTIMAL 
REPAIR PLAN 
Consider a system which has a vector of input variables 
I. Let the system output variable be X. Let us assume 
that the system has been given an input i. Further, we 
assume that the correct system output for this input 
is x(i) and we have observed that the output X has 
some value other than the correct output1. 
Consider a repair strategy R = (C1, C2, . . .  , Cn) · R is 
a sequence describing the order in which components 
will be replaced. We now develop an expression for 
the expected cost of R. We will refer to the action of 
replacing C; as fix;. In addition, we will refer to the 
system output X after replacement of the i-th com­
ponent in the sequence as X;. Note in particular that 
the variable Xo denotes the value of X before replace­
ment of any component. Let Sj be the sequence of 
observations and actions up to and including the re­
placement of Cj. That is: Sj = [I = i, Xo = -,x(i), 
jix1, X1 = -,x(i), jix2, X2 = •X(i), . . .  , /iXj-1, 
Xj-1 = •x(i), fixj]· The expected cost of R is given 
by: 
EC(R\1 = i, X= -,x(i)) = 
(c1 + 
P(X1 = •x(i)\S1)(c2 + 
P(X2 = •x(i)\S2)(ca + 
P(Xn-1 = •x(i)\Sn-1)Cn . . . ) . · .))) 
(1) 
To determine the expected cost as described in Equa­
tion 1,we need to compute the conditional probabilities 
P(Xj = -,x(i)\Sj), 1 � j < n. 
We demonstrate how these probabilities can be com­
puted using an example. Consider the electronic cir­
cuit in Fig 1(a). This system model for this cir­
cuit can be translated into a Bayesian network as 
displayed in Fig 1(b) (see [Srinivas, 1994] for de­
tails about this transformation). We will elucidate 
1 Note that we can determine the correct system output 
by simply simulating the system forward from the input i 
while assuming that each of the components C; are in the 
ok; state. 
(a) 
Figure 1: An electronic-circuit example. (a) A system 
model showing components and interconnectivity, and 
(b) the corresponding Bayesian network for the system 
model. 
Figure 2: Representation of the situation after replac­
ing the AND gate. Arcs between copies of the static 
network represent persistence of state. 
the computation of the conditional distribution using 
this Bayesian network. Consider the repair sequence 
R = (AND, XOR, OR). The network of Fig 2 repre­
sents the situation after the AND gate has been re­
placed. The modes of the X 0 R and 0 R gates are un­
affected by this replacement and have the same value 
both before and after the repair action. The arcs be­
tween the copies of the static network in Fig 2 model 
this persistence2 . 
The probability P(X1 = •x(i)ISl) can be computed 
by declaring the evidence sl in the network, propagat­
ing it and then looking up the posterior belief of the 
event X 1 = •x(i) in node X 1· The evidence S1 con­
sists of: (a) the known state of the input both before 
and after the repair action, (b) the output X0 (which 
has the value •x(i) ) ,  and (c) the state of the AND 
gate after repair (M�ND = ok). The corresponding 
nodes are shown shaded gray in the figure. 
We will now develop an iterative scheme for making 
this computation without explicitly constructing the 
dynamic Bayesian network of Fig 3. We begin by de­
scribing one step of this iterative scheme. 
We note that there are active paths (see [Pearl, 1988]) 
2See [Balke & Pearl, 1994; Heckerman & Shachter, 1994; 
Darwiche & Goldszmidt, 1994] for details on modeling 
persistence. 
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to node X1 from node Xo through the nodes MxaR 
and MaR· Hence the computation of the posterior 
of X1 will necessarily have to consider cases for every 
possible joint state3 of the variables MxaR and MaR· 
The computation can be written as follows: 
P(X1 = •x(i)IS!) = 
EmxoR,ffiORP(Xl = •x(i)II = i, M�ND = ok, 
MxaR = mxaR, MaR = maR) x 
P(MxaR = mxaR, MaR= maRl 
I = i, Xo = •x(i) ) (2) 
In the above equation, mxaR and maR represent 
generic states of MxaR and MaR respectively. Hence 
the summation in the equation iterates over all possi­
ble joint states of MxaR and MaR· The equation also 
accounts for the fact that knowing the state of MxoR 
and MaR makes X1 conditionally independent of Xo. 
Assume that we have access to the probability distri­
bution P(MxaR,MaRII = i,Xo = •x(i) ) (i.e., the 
second term of Equation 2). As we shall see later, this 
distribution is the output of the previous step of the it­
erative scheme. We note that the probabilities needed 
for the first term of the equation, P(X1 = •x(i) II = 
i, M�ND = ok, MxaR = mxaR, MaR = maR), can 
be computed directly from the static Bayesian network 
of Fig 1 (b). This is so because knowing the states of 
MxaR and MaR makes the post-repair network frag­
ment (shown within the dotted lines in Fig 2) inde­
pendent of the rest of the network. The post-repair 
network fragment is identical to the static Bayesian 
network. Thus, the required probability can be com­
puted by (a) declaring the evidence MAND = ok, 
MxaR = mxaR, MaR = maR, I = i in the static 
network, and (b) propagating the evidence and look­
ing up the posterior of the event X = •x(i) in node 
X. 
Now, let us consider the replacement of the next com­
ponent specified by the repair strategy, i.e., the XOR 
gate. The situation is shown in Fig 3. By analogy the 
previous situation, we can compute P(X2 = •x(i)IS2) 
as: 
P(X2 = •x(i)IS2) = 
EmoRP(X2 = •x(i)II = i, M�aR = ok, 
M�ND = ok, MaR= moR) x 
P(MaR =maR I = i, Xo = •x(i) , 
M�ND = ok, xl = •x(i)) (3) 
Here, again, the probabilities for the first term in the 
equation can be directly computed from the system 
model. We will now see how the probabilities for the 
second term can be computed from the computations 
of the previous repair step (i.e., Equation 2). Note 
that the product within the summation of Equation 2 
3 A joint state of a set of dis�rete random variables as­
signs a value to each of the variables in the set. 
526 Srinivas and Horvitz 
Figure 3: Situation after replacing the XOR gate. 
is equal to: 
P(X1 = -.x(i) , MxaR = mxaR, MaR= maRl 
I =  i, Xo = -.x(i), M�ND = ok) 
If we sum the distribution above over all joint states 
of MxaR and MaR we obtain the marginal P(X1 = 
-.x(i)II = i, Xo = -.x(i) , M�ND = ok). Dividing each 
element the distribution above by this marginal gives 
us: 
P(MxaR = mxaR, MaR= maR II= i, 
Xo = -.x(i),M�ND = ok,X1 = -.x(i) ) (4) 
Now, we consider the action of replacing the X 0 R 
gate. This does not affect our estimate of what state 
the OR gate is in; it has no affect on the posterior 
probability distribution of MaR given the current state 
of information. This posterior probability is: 
P(MaR =maR II =  i, Xo = -.x(i) , M�ND = ok, 
xl = -.x(i) ) 
This posterior distribution can be computed by sum­
ming the distribution of Equation 4 over all states of 
MxaR· Note that this distribution is precisely what 
we need to solve Equation 3. 
This example can be generalized to yield a simple it­
erative scheme for computing P(Xj = -.x(i)ISj) for 
1 � j < n, given a repair sequence R. The key idea is 
that all of the information coming from the first j - 1 
observation repair actions is summarized by the pos­
terior probability distribution over the joint states of 
the components which have not yet been fixed (i.e., C i 
through Cn). This posterior probability is used itera­
tively to perform the following calculations: 
• Compute the probability of an anomaly after the 
j-th fix action (i.e. , P(Xj = -.x(i)ISi) ) .  
• Compute the new updated posterior, accounting 
for the j-th action. Note that this posterior is 
over the joint states of Ci+1 through Cn. 
To begin the iteration, we need to have the posterior 
over all joint states of all the components, given that no 
observation and repair actions have been performed. 
Note that this posterior probability is just the prior 
probability over the joint states of the components. As 
components fail independently, this distribution is the 
product of the marginal distributions over the modes 
of each component. 
In general, when computing P(Xj = -.x(i)ISi) we note 
that there is an active path in the corresponding dy­
namic Bayesian network from the observed node Xj _1 
to the target node Xj through the mode variable of 
each unfixed component (i.e., there are active paths 
through Mj+1, Mj+2, ... , Mn)· As a result, a cutset 
for the network necessarily includes each of these vari­
ables. This implies that any inference algorithm com­
puting P(Xj = -.x(i) !Si) will necessarily have to con­
dition on each joint state of the modes of the unfixed 
components. Our iterative scheme explicitly does this 
conditioning by carrying forward the posterior over the 
cutset nodes. Thus, its complexity is of the same order 
as any other scheme for performing this computation. 
In this sense, our scheme is for computing the proba­
bilities P(Xj = -.x(i) ISj) is optimal. 
2.1.1 Computing the best strategy 
We now have the probabilities required to solve Equa­
tion 1, enabling us to compute the expected cost 
EC(RII = i, X = -.x(i)) ,  given a strategy R and a 
system input I = i. Identifying the best strategy can 
be done by checking the expected cost of all strategies. 
Computing the best strategy can be done in O(n!SM) 
where n is the number of components and SM is the 
joint space size of the mode variables of all the com­
ponents. SM is exponential in n. 
To compute the optimal repair plan, we must compute 
the best possible strategy for every possible input value 
to the system. Let the joint space size of the inputs 
to the system be S1. The overall complexity of com­
puting the optimal strategy for every possible input 
to the system is then O(n! x SM x SJ) . Computing 
the optimal repair plan with the algorithm described 
above is impractical for large systems. We now modify 
our algorithm to exploit the hierarchical structure of 
systems so that the method can be scaled up to large 
systems. 
3 HIERARCHICAL SYSTEMS 
It is common in engineering practice to manage the 
complexity of systems by organizing them into hierar­
chical assemblies of components. Hierarchical config­
urations simplify the task of design, construction, and 
repair of complex systems by grouping system compo-
nents into subsystems with well-defined functionalities 
and manageable interdependencies. We will now focus 
on the details of an extension to the general repair 
formulation and inference procedure that allows us to 
take advantage of hierarchical system specifications. 
The extension builds on a formulation of hierarchical 
systems in [Srinivas, 1994]. 
3.1 DEFINING THE HIERARCHICAL 
MODEL 
When performing hierarchical modeling, an engineer 
has the option of modeling each component of the 
system either atomically or hierarchically. An atomic 
component model has no further substructure, and is 
defined exactly as in Section 2. A hierarchical com­
ponent model specifies the behavior of components in 
terms of the behaviors of its subcomponents. Thus, a 
hierarchically modeled component is really a subsys­
tem. 
We use the term component to refer to a portion of 
a system that can be tested and replaced as a unit, 
whether or not it can be decomposed into subcompo­
nents. To specify a component hierarchically, the user 
has to specify the component's input variables, the 
output variable, and the mode variable for the compo­
nent (as in the case of an atomic model). Specifying a 
variable involves identifying its name and its states. In 
addition, the user has to specify a subcomponent model 
for the component. A subcomponent model is simply 
another hierarchical system model. The system input 
variables of the subcomponent model are the same as 
the input variables of the component and the system 
output variable of the subcomponent model is the the 
output variable of the component. Note that each sub­
component in the subcomponent model can itself be 
modeled hierarchically or atomically. 
In repairing hierarchically structured systems, we must 
consider two costs for each component C-the replace­
ment cost and the inspection cost. The replacement 
cost c is the cost of replacing the entire component. 
The inspection cost d "buys access" to the values of 
the component's input variables and output variable 
during the repair process. If we decide to pay the 
inspection cost and then find that the observed out­
put reading of the component is anomalous for the 
observed input, we have two options: (1) replace the 
entire component, or (2) successively repair subcompo­
nents of the component, checking whether the anoma­
lous output has been fixed after each subcomponent 
repatr. 
As in Section 2.1, we assume that the input value 
remains fixed. We also assume that a hierarchically 
modeled component is in the ok state if and only if 
every one of its subcomponents is in the ok state. Any 
joint state of the subcomponents which includes any 
non-ok state thus has to correspond to some non-ok 
state of the component. This correspondence is spec­
ified as an abstraction function (see [Srinivas, 1994]). 
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For simplicity, in this presentation we will assume that 
each component has only two possible states-normal 
( ok) and broken (b). In this case, every possible joint 
state of the subcomponents which contains at least one 
b state will automatically map to the b state of the 
containing component. 
3.2 COMPILING THE HIERARCHICAL 
MODEL 
Say a component C with inputs I, output 0 and mode 
variable M is modeled hierarchically, and its sub­
components Ci are modeled atomically. We can eas­
ily compute the distribution P(M). We do this as 
P(M = ok) = II;P(Mt = ok;) and P(M = b) = 
1- P(M = ok). In addition, we can sum out all the 
internal variables of the subcomponent model to ob­
tain the distribution P(OI , M) (see [Srinivas, 1994]). 
Thus, we can compile the subcomponent model into an 
atomic description of the component. As we shall see, 
we will use these atomic descriptions when computing 
the optimal repair plan. 
It is not necessary that the subcomponents Ci be mod­
eled atomically for this compilation process to be pos­
sible. We need only to ensure that an atomic descrip­
tion of each Ci is available when computing the atomic 
description of C. This can be ensured by a bottom 
up traversal of the hierarchy tree of the system dur­
ing which each component's atomic description is com­
puted. 
3.3 HIERARCHICAL REPAIR PLANS 
A component's hierarchical repair plan specifies a re­
pair strategy for each joint value i of the input variables 
I of the component. The repair strategy specifies what 
needs to be done if the input value is i and the output 
is anomalous. The repair strategy can either specify 
(a) replacement of the component or (b) repair of sub­
components. We will make the assumption that if an 
anomaly in a component is fixed by repair of subcom­
ponents, this results in the component being returned 
to the ok state (as in the case of replacement). 
When a strategy calls for repair of subcomponents, 
it also specifies an order in which the subcomponents 
are to be successively repaired until the output is no 
longer anomalous. In addition, the strategy also speci­
fies a repair method for each subcomponent. The repair 
method for the subcomponent can be either (a) replace­
ment (without inspection) or (b) inspection followed 
by repair (this repair is according to the subcompo­
nent's hierarchical repair plan). The specification of 
a hierarchical plan for a component also includes a 
specification of a hierarchical repair plan for each of 
its subcomponents. 
An optimal hierarchical repair plan for a component 
specifies the strategy of least expected cost for each 
joint input value i. At the top level of the hierarchical 
system, the entire system can be viewed as a single 
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component. The optimal hierarchical repair plan for a 
system is simply the optimal hierarchical repair plan 
for the component. 
3.4 COMPUTING THE OPTIMAL 
HIERARCHICAL REPAIR PLAN 
Consider a component C with inputs I, output 0 and 
mode variable M which is modeled hierarchically. Let 
the component's replacement cost be c. Assume it has 
subcomponents c�, c�, ... , c�, each of which has an 
atomic description available. 
Consider computing the optimal strategy for repair of 
C given that the input has the value i and the output 
is anomalous. Let us suppose that the subcomponents 
cannot be inspected. In this case, the only repair avail­
able for each subcomponent C'; is to replace it, incur­
ring cost ci . We note that we can use the algorithm 
developed in Section 2.1 to compute the optimal se­
quence OptSeq(i) in which to replace the components 
for this particular input. Let the expected cost of this 
sequence be EC(OptSeq(i)). 
We note that if EC(OptSeq(i)) ;::::: c then the optimal 
strategy for input I = i is simply to replace compo­
nent C if the output is anomalous. In the case where 
EC(OptSeq(i)) < c then the optimal strategy for in­
put I = i is to replace the components successively in 
the order OptSeq(i). 
Now, let us consider the general situation where we 
have the choice of either replacing a subcomponent 
or inspecting it and then repairing it according to its 
hierarchical repair plan. Assume that each subcompo­
nent's hierarchical repair plan has already been com­
puted and stored. Given a particular input i and some 
sequence Seq in which the subcomponents are to be re­
paired, we will develop a algorithm (Section 3.4.1) that 
chooses the repair method for each subcomponent such 
that the expected cost of repair is minimized. The al­
gorithm outputs the sequence Seq annotated with the 
best repair method for each component. Let us call 
this annotated sequence Seqm. The algorithm also 
outputs the expected cost EC(Seqm) of this optimal 
strategy. 
If we now compare EC(Seqm) across every possible 
sequence Seq we can find the best repair sequence 
(and the accompanying repair methods) for the in­
put i. Let this best sequence be OptSeqm(i). We 
can choose the best strategy of repair for C given the 
input is i and the output is anomalous as follows. If 
c ::=:; EC( OptSeqm (i)) then the optimal strategy is sim­
ply to replace component C. If c > EC(OptSeqm(i)), 
then the optimal strategy is to repair subcomponents 
in the sequence (and with the methods) specified by 
EC(OptSeqm(i)). 
An optimal hierarchical repair plan for the hierarchical 
system can be computed through a bottom-up traver­
sal of the tree representing the hierarchical decomposi­
tion of the system. At each node of the tree (represent-
ing each component), the algorithm described above 
can be used to synthesize an optimal hierarchical re­
pair plan for the component from the subcomponent 
model, as well as the optimal hierarchical repair plans 
of the subcomponents. 
3.4.1 Computing Seqm 
Let us consider the case where a system component 
C has n subcomponents. Let X be the component's 
output variable. Assume that the optimal hierarchical 
repair plan for each subcomponent Cj of C has already 
been computed and is available. Let OptECJ (IJ = 
i�, XJ = •xj (ij)) be the optimal repair cost of Cj given 
tbat Its input is ij and that its output XJ is anomalous. 
Note that this repair cost is available from the precom­
puted optimal hierarchical plan for the subcomponent 
c;. 
Let Seqa be some annotated sequence in which the 
components are to be repaired. The annotation spec­
ifies a repair method mi for each subcomponent Cj. 
If mj = replace then Cj is simply replaced. If 
mi = inspect then Cj is inspected and then repaired 
according to its optimal hierarchical repair plan. The 
cost of repair of Cj in Seqa is a function of the method 
of repair mj. We refer to this cost as Cost( Cj, mj). 
We can compute the expected cost of Seqa as: 
EC(Seqaii = i, X= •x(i)) = (5) 
(Cost(CL ml) + 
P(X1 = •xiiS1)(Cost(C�, m2) + 
P(X2 = •xiiS2)(Cost(C�, m3) + 
The probabilities P(Xj = •xi lSi) for 1 ::=:; j ::=:; n can 
computed as described earlier with the iterative algo­
rithm of Section 2.1. However, we have yet to specify 
how to compute Cost(Cj,mj)· 
If mj = replace then Cost( Cj, ffij) is simply the re­
placement cost cj of Cj . If mj = inspect then the 
cost has two components. The first is the inspection 
cost. The second is the expected cost of fixing Cj hier­
archically. This expected cost depends on the current 
context. The current context includes the observations 
Sj-1 and the observation Xj = ..,x(i). Thus we have 
Cost(CJ ,mi) = dj + ECHR(Cj 1Si- 1 , Xi = •x(i)). 
Here, EC H R is the expected cost of repair of Cj us­
ing its optimal hierarchical repair plan in the current 
context. 
The current context gives us updated informa­
tion about the probability distribution over the in­
put and output of Cj. This updated informa­
tion is summarized by the conditional distribution 
P(Ij, XJ lSi, Xi = •x(i)). Given this conditional dis­
tribution, ECH R(Cj 1Si_1, Xi = •x(i)) can be com­
puted as: 
ECH R(CJISi-1, Xi = •x(i)) = 
Ei�OptECJ(Ij = ij, XJ = •xj(ij)) x J 
P(Ij = ij, XJ = •xj(ij)ISi-1, Xi = •x(i)) 
Note that the second term within the summation is 
just the posterior probability of seeing input i1 in con­
junction with an anomalous output. When this situ­
ation occurs we use the optimal hierarchical strategy 
of cost OptEC�(P = i� X� = •x� (i�)) Thus the J J J' J J J • ' 
above equation computes the expected cost. The prob-
lem now reduces to that of computing the distribution 
P(Ij,XJ ISi, Xi = •x(i)). We will solve this below. 
In summary, we now have an algorithm for calculat­
ing the expected cost of the annotated sequence Seqa. 
This algorithm can be modified to give the optimal an­
notated sequence Seqm as follows: Given a sequence 
Seq, if Cost(Cj,replace) < Cost (Cj ,inspect), we 
choose to replace rather than inspect Cj . If the in­
equality is reversed, we choose to inspect rather than 
to replace the component. 
The distribution P(Ij, XJ lSi, Xi = •x(i)) can be com­
puted using the same idea which was used to compute 
P(Xi = •x(i) ISi) in Section 2.1. That is, we can use 
the fact that knowing the state (mode) of every com­
ponent and the system input makes Ij independent of 
the history of observations and repairs Si. Let M[i,i) 
represent the set of variables { M;, Mi+1, . . . , Mi}. 
Let m[i,j) be a generic joint state of these variables. 
Let ok[i,i) be the state where each of the variables in 
the ok state. 
We can then compute the needed probability distribu­
tion as: 
P(Ij = ij,XJ = xjiSi,Xi = •x(i)) = (6) 
Emli+t.nJ P(Ij = ij, XJ = xj I = i, M[1,i) = ok[1,i)• 
M[j+1,n) = m[j+1,n)> Xi= •x(i)) X 
P(M[j+1,nJ = mu+1,nJISi) 
The first term in the summation can be computed di­
rectly from the static Bayesian network corresponding 
to the model. Consider applying the clustering in­
ference algorithm to the static network ([Lauritzen & 
Spiegelhalter, 1988; Jensen et al, 1990]). The cluster­
ing inference algorithm guarantees that for each com­
ponent Cj, the output variable XJ and the variables 
in Ij necessarily will be in the same clique. This is 
because each variable in Ij is a parent of XJ . Let 
this clique be Cliquej. If we propagate the evidence 
i, ok[1,i)• m[j+1,n) and X = •x(i) in this network, 
and then sum over all the variables other than Ij and 
XJ in the posterior belief of Cliquej and renormalize, 
we obtain the distribution P(Ij, XJ I  = i, M[1,n) = 
m[1,n)• Xi = •x(i)). Note that the computation of 
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P(Ij = iJ, XJ = xjiSi, Xi = •x(i)) can be integrated 
into the tterative algorithm of Section 2.1. 
The distribution P(M[j+1,n) = m[j+l,nJISi) in the sec­
ond term of the above equation is computed by the 
iterative algorithm of Section 2.1. 
3.4.2 Repair Algorithm: Review 
In review, the algorithm for computing the optimal 
hierarchical repair plan proceeds as follows: 
1. Model compilation: An atomic description for 
each component is computed by a bottom up 
traversal of the hierarchy tree. 
2. Plan computation: In a bottom up traversal 
of the hierarchy tree, for each component C with 
output 0 and input I and subcomponents Cj, 1 :::; 
j:::; n: 
For every possible input i of C: 
- For every possible sequence Seq of the 
subcomponents, compute the optimal an­
notation Seqm and its expected cost. 
Let the cheapest of these annotated se­
quences be OptSeqm(i). 
- Compare the cost ofOptSeqm(i) with the 
replacement cost c to compute the opti­
mal repair strategy for input i. 
3.5 COMPLEXITY OF THE ALGORITHM 
Say that any variable in the hierarchical system model 
(input, output or mode) has at most s states, and 
that s is small. This is reasonable for discrete systems 
with a small number of states for any state variable 
(e.g., such as digital circuits). Let the maximum num­
ber of subcomponents of any component be b-this is 
also the branching factor of the tree representing the 
system hierarchy. If each component has at most m 
input variables, the number of variables in the sub­
component model is O(m x b). 
It is straightforward to show that the computation of 
the optimal hierarchical repair algorithm at every node 
of the hierarchy tree is bounded by O(b!s(m x b)). If we 
assume that the b and mare small (which is reasonable 
if we are modeling a system hierarchically) the com­
putation is tractable (see Section 3.7). Let us refer to 
the expression (b!s(m x b)) as B. 
If a hierarchical model has N leaf level components in 
the hierarchy tree, then the total number of compo­
nents (including interior nodes in the tree) is O(N). 
The optimal hierarchical repair algorithm for this 
model has an overall complexity of 0( N B). Hence, the 
performance of the algorithm is linear in the size of the 
hierarchical system. The algorithm is thus tractable if 
B is reasonably small. 
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3.6 INTRODUCING FLEXIBILITY 
We can modify the algorithm to flexibly trade off the 
quality of repair plans with computation time. Flexi­
ble, incremental-refinement procedures make it possi­
ble to maximize the value of computational procedures 
�iven variation and uncertainty in the costs of time 
[Horvitz, 1988]. Consider a hierarchy tree with d lev­
els of branching and a branching factor of b. The top 
(first) level of the hierarchy tree has one component, 
the next (second) level has b components, the third 
level has b2 components and so on till the d-th level 
which has bd-l components. Say that we apply the 
exhaustive algorithm for computing the optimal hier­
archical repair plan repeatedly, but with the following 
modification: At the k-th iteration, we assume that 
the components at the k-th level cannot be inspected 
- they can only be replaced. As a result, in the k-th 
iteration we need to consider only those components 
which are between level 1 and level k when computing 
the optimal hierarchical plan. 
Thus, in the first iteration, the modified algorithm con­
siders only replacement of the entire system if the out­
put is anomalous. In the second phase, the method 
compares replacement of the entire system with in­
specting it and carrying out an optimal replacement 
sequence of its direct subcomponents - the compo­
nents at the second level of the hierarchy tree. The 
third iteration considers inspection of the subcompo­
nents at the second level of the hierarchy tree but only 
replacement of components at the third level of the 
hierarchy tree, and so on. The k-th iteration of the 
algorithm will compute an optimal hierarchical plan 
in O(b'" B). Thus early iterations run very quickly but 
give crude answers. Later iterations take longer but 
give more refined answers. Note that the iterative pro­
cess can be interrupted at any time to yield the current 
answer. Essentially, we are applying the exhaustive al­
gorithm with iterative deepening. 
3. 7 IMPLEMENTATION 
We have implemented the algorithm in LISP on a Sun 
workstation. Running on a hierarchical digital circuit 
with a branching factor b = 4 and m = 3, the (un­
optimized) implementation takes about 3.2 minutes 
to compute the policy at each node of the hierarchy 
tree. For a system with 256 leaf level components this 
amounts to about 18 hours of computation to com­
pute the global optimal hierarchical plan. Thus, the 
present implementation can be considered suitable for 
off-line precomputation of optimal hierarchical repair 
plans for medium sized systems. Of course, if we em­
ploy the iterative-deepening version of the algorithm, 
we can get lower quality answers more quickly. For 
example, if the flexible repair strategy looks only 3 
levels down the hierarchy tree, the optimal plan can 
be computed in 67 minutes. We expect that an opti­
mized implementation of the algorithm should be able 
to scale up to systems with thousands of components. 
4 DISCUSSION 
Computing an optimal repair strategy is intractable 
for a general formulation of the repair problem (see for 
example, [Beckerman et al, 1995]). In the general case, 
we must identify the best repair strategy from a com­
binatorial space of strategies. Two types of simplifica­
tions have been employed to address this complexity. 
With one approach, the repair problem is restricted 
by assuming or identifying additional structure in the 
problem. In the other approach, attempts are made 
to compute some good immediate repair action, based 
on a limited lookahead. Such greedy approaches are 
applied in an interactive procedure, where a recom­
mended action is used to gather additional informa­
tion that is used in the next iteration of the myopic 
analysis. We have taken the first of these approaches­
we exploit the system hierarchy to get computational 
gains. 
Let us explore in more detail the basis for the efficien­
cies we gain by exploiting hierarchical structure. Con­
sider a hierarchical system where Ci and C� are sub­
components of cl and c� and c� are subcomponents 
of C2• Say the inspection costs of non-leaf components 
is zero, that their replacement cost is very high, and 
that leaf components cannot be inspected. In such 
a case, the optimal repair sequence is a sequence of 
leaf component replacements. If we ignored hierarchy, 
we would have to consider every possible sequence of 
the leaf components. However, when we represent and 
exploit the hierarchy, some of these sequences are im­
possible (for example, (Ci, C�, C�, C�)). This is because 
the repair protocol specifies that either cl is fixed first 
or C2 is fixed first. Thus we are effectively considering 
only those repair sequences in which both of ci and 
c� appear (in some order) before c� and c� (in some 
order) and those sequences in which both of c� and c� 
appear before Ci and C�. Thus, the hierarchy gives us 
a substantial reduction in the search space. 
The approach we have taken takes advantage of the 
system model, rather than restricting it. Other 
researchers have shown how restricting the system 
model can make precomputation of repair strategies 
tractable. [Kalagnanam & Henrion, 1988] derive an 
optimality condition for the optimal repair strategy in 
a multi-component system which is assumed to have a 
single fault. The repair protocol is similar to the one 
described in this paper with the exception that only 
component replacements are allowed. There is no no­
tion of inspection of components. [Srinivas, 1995] gen­
eralizes the result of [Kalagnanam & Henrion, 1988] 
to the case of multiple independent failures and intro­
duces a formulation of component inspection. [Beck­
erman et al, 1995] also employs the single-fault restric­
tion. In this work, repair is formulated as an interac­
tive process. The system is modeled with a Bayesian 
network and both component replacement and infor­
mation gathering actions are possible. An action is 
chosen at each step of the process, taking advantage 
of a myopic heuristic. 
The work in the model-based diagnosis community 
([Hamscher et al, 1992]) has also addressed the re­
pair problem as an interactive process. [deKleer & 
Williams, 1987] introduce an entropy-based method 
for observation planning. [Friedrich & Nejdl, 1992] 
develop a set of greedy algorithms for choosing obser­
vation and repair actions in interactive model-based 
diagnosis. Their approach explicitly considers down­
time costs of unanticipated failures. Hence their repair 
scheme implicitly includes a notion of preventive main­
tenance. [Poole & Provan, 1991] use repair actions 
to partition the world into a set of classes. All the 
worlds in a class result in the same action response. 
In their formulation, the diagnosis problem becomes 
one of determining the class of the current state of 
the system. [Yuan, 1993] proposes a decision-theoretic 
framework for modeling interactive model-based diag­
nosis. At each step of the diagnosis, a decision model, 
in the form of an influence diagram, is synthesized and 
solved to compute the next action. The model is suc­
cessively refined along the system hierarchy using a 
single fault assumption until the fault is located. 
The emphasis in this paper has been to address the 
problem of precomputing good strategies rather than 
interleaving action and repair planning. We have pre­
sented the hierarchical repair algorithm developed in 
this paper in the context of model-based diagnosis. 
However, it is equally applicable to diagnosis models 
which are developed directly as hierarchical Bayesian 
networks. 
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